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Abstract:  
 
The purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between board size, number 
of non-executive directors, the financial expertise of the non-executive directors 
representing the audit committee and the audit quality.  
 
Data from non-financial firms listed in the Indonesian Stock Exchange have been used. To 
achieve the research objectives, we have used the logit regression. The data of 121 listed 
firms in a five-year period from 2012 to 2016 is collected from the printed audit accounts 
available on companies‘ websites. The emergence of corporate governance phenomena has 
brought upon many structural changes in firms‘ governance structure such as the audit 
committee role and the audit quality.  
 
The second decade which starts with the warmth of subprime crisis has seen a significant 
development in the code of corporate governance. The role of the audit committee is now 
significant and being recognized as the solution of prevention of internal fraud.  
 
The findings of the study have shown that in non-financial firms listed in the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange audit committee and board characteristics have significant effect on audit 
quality. This study will be helpful for students, auditors, policymakers and researchers to 
understand the impact of corporate governance in audit quality.  
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1. Introduction 
The turbulent impacts of the worldwide financial related emergency has highlighted 
the basic significance of tenable excellent financial reporting. The business 
environment in Nigeria for example, has been graded negatively by foreign investors 
few weeks after this emergency. Akinjobi and Omowumi (2010) decreed 
explanations behind this statement incorporating the failure of financial reports to 
address the issues of this group of clients. The commonness of fraud over the 
earnings management and other financial activities in the nation, has decreased the 
level of certainty rested in these financial statements and in the capacity of these 
remarks to perform their essential capacities. Considering the expense of fakes to 
the business and the guilty party, it is critical to create strategies to avert or 
distinguish business fraud and investigating the dangerous elements connected with 
the business.  
 
The respectability of the financial related reporting system is being 
scrutinized, the trustworthiness of the auditor is in uncertainty and an organization 
control structure is at risk to be blamed in perspective of the absence of auditor 
flexibility  and oversight from the board. DeFond and Francis (2005) and DeFond 
and Zhang, (2014) claimed that the result of the corporate shock has restored the 
importance of self-ruling audits and their linkage to the checking part of 
corporate governance. Fulfilling quality financial reporting depends upon the part 
that the outside audit plays in supporting the way of financial reporting as referred to 
organizations. 
 
Numerous and inevitable changes in the governance and evaluating systems 
keep on emphasizing the key part of the audit committee in viable stewardship. 
Audit committee serves the premiums of stakeholders and investors through their 
autonomous oversight of the yearly corporate reporting process, incorporating the 
organization's correlation with the outside auditor. 
 
This desire is predictable with the commendations of Levitt's Blue-Ribbon Panel. 
Auditing reacts inside  of the setting of an accounting firm. The discernible result of 
the audit is an audit report that is issued for the sake of the accounting firm, alongside 
with the investors and clients inspected financial performance. Audits are of higher 
quality at the info level when the general individuals actualizing audit tests are 
able and autonomous, and when the testing systems utilized are equipped for 
delivering solid and applicable confirmation (Hapsoro and Suryanto, 2017; Suryanto 
and Thalassinos, 2017). 
 
Audit quality is a reliable evidence amongst the most basic issues in audit practice 
today. Audit quality has been characterized as the joint likelihood that a current 
material blunder is identified and reported by an auditor (DeAngelo, 1981). This 
directly affects the financial reporting, audit quality can assist by characterized as 
the capacity of an auditor to give an autonomous audit free from misquoting, 
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mistakes and misrepresentation (Baldacchino et al., 2017). The accounting firms 
are to convey information on the financial ground, execution corporate 
governance practices of a firm and high caliber that is convenient for financial 
specialists and creditors to settle on investors choices. The audit committee and 
accounting firms assume a huge part in finding out the legitimacy, worthiness and 
unwavering quality of high caliber. Both audit committee and quality can minimize 
agency cost. 
 
This study assesses, how organizations give an ideal setting to consider the impact 
of auditor choice on their loan fees. It shows, connecting with a Big Four auditor, 
which has a brand name reputation for supplying a higher-quality audit could 
upgrade the believability  of financial proclamations, empowers young firms to 
decrease their acquiring costs. 
 
Datar et al. (1991) contend that substantial, prestigious public accounting firms 
worried about securing their interest in reputation capital having more motivator 
than different auditors to supply reliable and transparency audit quality. Balvers et 
al. (1988) found that high-reputation auditors allow capitalist to diminish the 
degree of extent of ex- ante uncertainty in new value issues. Copley and 
Douthett (2002) observed the extensive literature on the connection between the 
expense of capital in firms' underlying open offerings and audit quality. 
Lenders may incline toward that young firms, which are simply framing their 
reputations for obligation overhauling, have higher-quality audits. 
 
2. Literature Review  
 
Audit quality  broadly  refers to the services performed by  the auditors engaged by  
the client firms. Firms demanded higher quality  audit because  of the  standard and 
the experience  they have acquired. Hiring audit quality would attract more 
investors and picture the performance of the organization. Hence, stakeholders 
and investors will have confidence and trust in the company that engaged in higher 
audit quality because of reputation and experiences that accounting firms with audit 
quality provided (Fama, 1980; Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
 
Therefore, there is no decided measurement in measuring the audit quality. 
Previous studies have used different proxies in measuring the audit quality. Some of 
the studies used audit fees as a proxy as in Yassin and Nelson (2012). They used 
accrual quality as a proxy for audit quality. The other proxy used in measuring the 
audit quality as being discretionary accruals, the ex-ante cost of equity capital 
and analyst forecast accuracy and employ propensity-score used as proxies as in 
Lawrence et al., 2011. Hence, one of the proxies for audit quality used in this study 
is the Big  Four versus non Big  Four reputation as used by  Eshleman and Guo 
(2014) and McGowan et al., (2014)  
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The reputation of the auditor is one of the ways to measure the audit quality and 
high reputation auditors are considered to the target players in the audit market 
which broadly refers to the Big Four Firms. DeAngelo (1981) provides the best 
normal descriptions of the level of audit quality. The  description of audit quality  was 
characterized as the ‘‘market assessed chance that a given auditor can (a) discover 
a breach within the client’s register and (b) report the breach.” The designation is 
gotten by the business sector because the capacity of an audit to discover 
accounting errors thus, inapplicable audit sentiment. Watts and Zimmerman (1986) 
relate to breach of auditor reports into two probabilities: the discovered breach 
(independence) by auditor reports and the auditor discovered the breach 
(competence). 
 
Therefore, detecting and revealing/correcting an error in the financial statement is a 
function of independence and competence of the Big Accounting Firms. 
DeAngelo (1981) also described that wherever the essential part alludes to auditor’s 
capacity and the elements the auditors apply to the audit, in terms of experience, 
unqualified reports, transparency and standard litigation would determine whether 
the auditor is independent. Schandl (1978) claims the auditor’s independence as 
a required situation to the competence of Big Accounting Firms. 
 
Citron and Taffler (1992) reveal that audit quality has valued when both 
technically independence and competence are attributed to the audit process. 
Wolnizer (1987) expressed, the motto “independent in fact and independent in 
appearance” served as objectivity and attitude of impartiality i.e. the “ mental” 
process of the auditor and the “competence” as the perception of investors, 
shareholders, clients, regulatory board and financial market on Big Accounting 
Firms. Flint (1988) observed in fact and in appearance to independence as 
trust and capacity of judgment between the clients and higher audit quality. 
 
The competence and independence of Big Accounting Firms should be 
considered as reliable information, qualification, sufficient knowledge, and 
experience to deliver higher audit quality  (Flint, 1988). Lee and Stone (1995) 
documented the probable of Big Accounting Firms’ competence to be followed by 
higher quality in independence. The more probable the local accounting  firm is 
incompetent, the more  is probably the  low quality is dependent. Hence, auditor 
competence dominates the evaluation of audit quality.  
 
Firms with greater natural instability  (greater information asymmetry between the 
firm and outcasts) have a motivation to talk about their characteristic quality by 
enlisting an extra solid, top-notch auditor. This contention has primarily  been made 
inside the connection of initial public offerings (IPOs) and hence the evidence 
shows tha t  there is diminished proof of  spatial property (i.e. less underpricing) 
once opens to the world about large brand auditor (Beatty, 1989; Azam et al., 
2016). Big Four Firms are sued nearly less as a rule when overwhelming for 
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business size, and massive Big Four Firms authorized less as a rule by the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (Palmrose, 1988).  
 
Auditors spend significant time in fluctuated businesses to acknowledge an item 
separation and supply  higher quality  audit (Simunic and Stein, 1987; Suryanto, 
2014; Suryanto and Thalassinos, 2017). Higher nature of audit by  industry 
specialized moreover credited to the certainty that they  put vigorously  in 
innovations, physical offices and structure management system that change them 
to watch anomalies and distortions, a great deal of basic responsibility (Simunic and 
Stein, 1987; Hadi et al., 2016). Their capacity to supply higher quality  audits 
originates from their ability in serving numerous customers inside the same learning, 
industry and sharing best practices over the business (Thalassinos and Liapis, 2014; 
Denisova et al., 2017). 
 
Big Four Firms contain several semi-autonomous, city-based takes after 
workplaces. DeAngelo (1981) contention on audit quality and auditor size might 
be connected to the work environment level. As far as financial significance, for 
instance, a client that is little with respect to a Big Four Firm might be vital to 
no less than one of its workplaces. Consequently, previous studies have started 
to research audit quality at the working environment level (Reynolds and 
Francis, 2000). For example, Francis and Yu (2009) demonstrated that the larger 
workplaces of the Big Four Firms region unit of upper quality ,  which can be 
ascribed to greater workplaces, has a lot of measure in-house experience.  
 
Big Four Firms expertise area unit combines lot of independence and supply in 
higher quality audits. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) posit that accounting firms with 
higher quality management have been recognized as larger firms in lightweight 
of the actual fact that they need additional distinguished reputation to confirm. 
Moreover, it can be contended that Big Four Firms offer unmatched audit quality as 
their sheer size will bolster additional vigorous reports, standardized review 
procedures and additional decisions for correct second supporter audits. 
 
Table 1: BIG 4 Audit Firms in 2017 
Audit Firm Revenue Employees Fiscal year 
Deloitte $38.8 bn 263,900 2017 
PwC  $37.7 bn 236,235 2017 
EY  $31.4 bn 247,570 2017 
KPMG  $25.9 bn 188,982 2016 
Source: Companies Official Website and Printed Accounts.  
 
Although, there are no boot contentions with relevancy why large Big Four and 
Non-Big Four Firms may offer equal audit quality? First, massive Big Four and 
Non-Big Four firms are controlled by the identical body and knowledgeable 
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benchmarks, and in this manner, each kind of audit companies should stick to a 
useful wise level. This thought is bolstered by  Government Accountability  Office 
(GAO) of USA report issued in 2008 demonstrating that non-Big Four auditors are 
trying to induce cheap obligation protection scope (GAO 2008). Agency theory 
perceives evaluating together of the first perceptive instruments to manage hostile 
circumstances and cut office prices. 
 
Soltani (2014) claims that auditors utilize a couple of technics to understand 
misquotes in clients accounting structure and report the errors. Audit quality is 
the questionable problems for the late decades and the most  past confirmation 
recommends that absence  of audit quality is among the foremost imperative purpose 
behind financial and company outrage. Previous studies prove that audit quality, as 
an external company administration perceptive will improve t h e  organization’s 
performance (Gul and Leung, 2004; Bokhari and Khan, 2013). Auditors' 
obligations amplify well past the essential identification of "highly contrasting" 
GAAP infringement by giving confirmation of financial reportage quality. 
 
This obligation emerges from professional examining gauges that oblige 
auditors to contemplate "the quality, not solely the agreeableness" of the client's 
financial reporting Statement of Accounting Standard (SAS 90). It is more 
mirrored within the audit assessment, which provides certification that the 
"financial statements area unit properly exhibited as per GAAP," since cheap 
presentation needs a dependable illustration of the company's basic financial 
aspects as set by theFinancial Accounting Standard Board (FASB, 1980). The 
auditor's wide charge to contemplate financial reporting quality is in addition with 
court selections that hold examiners subject to deluding cash connected 
proclamations once these statements entirely have been adjusted to accumulation. 
 
The role of the audit committee in corporate governance is the subject of increasing 
public and regulatory interest. The audit committee is a sub-group of the full 
board. The audit committee gives the correspondence between the full board, 
insider auditor, outsider auditor, the executive  officers, and fund executives. Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) displayed a method of reasoning for the presence of the board 
audit committee that managers take the chance to act against shareholders' 
benefits when the agency cost increase. Contractual connections in the middle of 
shareholders and managers decrease agency costs. In any case, these agreements 
must be along w i t h  t h e  lines observed.  
 
The development of an audit committee emerges from the need to screen these 
agreements. Audit committee serves as trustees in a governance system, decreases 
information asymmetry in the middle of internal and external levels and in this 
manner, mitigates agency issues. Beasley et al. (2009) trusted that a successful audit 
committee has qualified individuals with authority and assets to ensure shareholders 
by safeguarding dependence on financial reporting, inward controls and hazard 
management. 
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The independence of audit committees from the management plays an important role 
in organizations because they have good reputations to transform transparency, 
support the board of directors, prevent inadequate activity and oversight function of 
financial reporting. The language of independence has been termed as the degree to 
which an audit committee comprises of non-executive’s directors. The Code of 
Corporate Governance in Indonesia (2016) posits that an independent director is a 
non-executive director who is not a considerable shareholder of the organization, is 
one whose shareholding, straightforwardly or in a roundabout way, does not surpass 
0.1% of the organization's capital.  
 
The independent non-executive directors on corporate groups identify with better 
checking of management choices and exercises by a corporate group. There is an 
indirect confirmation supporting the thought that an autonomous non-executive audit 
committee can deflect financial reporting aggressiveness and misrepresentation. 
Audit advisory groups have no less than two means accessible to practice oversight 
of financial reporting, the external auditor, and the inside auditor capacity. 
 
Blue  Ribbon Committee  (Millstein, 1999) observed  to reinforce  the part of audit  
groups, as regulators of the financial reporting process for the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated 
Quotations System (NASDAQ) also called (NASD) firms. BRC (1999) is about the 
change of necessity of NYSE and NASD to give space for recorded organizations to 
have audit boards of trustees without executive’s directors. Numerous other 
independent counseling bodies have planned rules with a recommendation to 
change both the audit committee and audit process.  For instance, it was prescribed 
by the Treadway Commission (Grundfest and Berueffy, 1989) that: "the audit 
board individuals from all public sectors ought to stay out from exclusively 
autonomous executives”. 
 
The committee of the audit should be free to perform their task appropriately (Zaman 
and Collier, 2005). Independence is pretty much as essential to the audit 
committee as it is imperative to the auditor (Carcello et al., 2011). This will 
permit them to manage the organization's issues in a targeted way with no type of 
bias. An autonomous audit committe is required to upgrade  the open trust in the 
corporate system with respect to their openness, competence in reporting and 
a consolation of adequate protections against false reporting and innovative 
accounting (Rezaee et al., 2003). 
 
It is likewise foreseen that the audit group ought to cradle the relationship 
among governance organs inside the firm and organs outside the firm (Rezaee, 2009). 
The freedom audit group advisory is vitally critical in upgrading the relationship 
between the outside auditor and management over the span of their obligations 
as well as in instances of quarrels between them (Arena et al., 2010). Keeping in 
mind the end goal to release their oversight capacities viably, is imperative 
that the committee is independent, non-executives of management. 
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Expertise and experience of audit committee individuals is an essential part of 
audit advisory group viability in managing the evaluated financial articulations. 
Corporate governance procurements internationally require that the audit committee 
be made from persons that have later and pertinent financial experience inferring  that 
they ought to have the capacity to, at any rate, read and comprehend the financial 
proclamations which incorporate the cash flow statement, notes to the accounts, 
income statement and the balance sheet. Furthermore, a large portion of these 
procurements additionally requires that no less than one individual among the 
individuals ought to have recent significant financial capabilities. 
 
The focal issue to this procurement is the requirement for the individual as non-
executive of the audit council to have between them the required experience and 
aptitude to have the capacity to release their oversight works adequately. As per 
Song and Windram (2004) a high level of financial proficiency is important for 
an audit brain trust to adequately  supervise an organization’s reporting and 
financial control. The part of an audit brain trust in supervising responsibility of 
the organization because the activity of the committee would cover and monitor 
the management and financial reporting. This requires the audit panel to have 
accounting information concept to procure an inside and outside comprehension 
of financial reporting and enhance consistency with administrative 
necessities. 
 
Moreover, DeFond et al. (2005) recommend that positive business sector 
response is focused on the organizations that are moderately solid in corporate 
governance. Educated audit brain trusts are better prepared to comprehend 
auditor’s judgments and observe the substance of contradictions in the middle 
of administration and the outer inspector (DeZoort and Salterio 2001). The 
attestation that compelling audit advisory brain trust must contain individuals who 
have abundant financial experience is predictable with a prior study on audit group 
skills. Based on the theoretical point of view this study i s  depended on agency 
theory.  
 
As indicated by agency theory, organization relationship is an agreement under 
which "one or more persons (main) who is the economic assets proprietor 
draw in someone else (agent) who is accused of utilizing and controlling 
these assets to perform some administration for their sake, which includes 
appointing some basic leadership power to the agents" (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976).  
 
Nonetheless, this theory expects that management (as agents) cannot be trusted to 
make the best move for the general shareholders and public (as main) because 
the agents will represent their own advantages. To accomplish the arrangement of 
the agent's interest, limit agency cost and principal advantage, different inside and 
outside corporate governance components, have been recommended (Haniff and 
Huduib, 2006). 
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           3.     Data and Methodology  
 
The collection of secondary  data of 121 firms listed in the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange was collected through the channel of annual reports for the years 2012-
2016. The annual reports were used to collect the data concerning the audit 
committee and Big Four/Non-Big Four Firms. The independent and dependent 
variables are measured classified and quantified into a numerical scheme. 
Therefore, the association between the audit committee and t h e  audit quality is 
examined and assessed in a very applied statistical mean from the data collected. 
The study is predicated on a panel data methodology. 
 
Al-Ghamdi (2001) claimed that regression method is broadly utilized for breaking 
down the relationship between dependent variable and one or more 
independent variables. Logistic regression, like Least Squares Regression, is a 
measurement method that is utilized to investigate the relationship between a 
dependent variable and at least one independent variable. The regression 
techniques can be connected when the dependent variable is categorical. As a 
result, the remainder of this study discussion will focus on independent variables 
in this regression analysis. 
 
The study carried out some diagnostic test to confirm the validity of the regression 
result. Based on linear regression model the variance of each error term needs to 
be constant (homoscedasticity) likewise there should be the absence of correlation 
between the error terms (autocorrelation). Based on the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation the prob > F test is significant (0.000) suggesting the presence 
of autocorrelation. Similarly, the white test for homoscedasticity reveals a prob > 
chi2 that is significant at 0.0214 rejecting the null hypotheses of homoscedasticity 
and showing the presence of heteroscedasticity, which indicates that the error terms 
are not constant. 
 
On this note, the logit regression model was used considering the robust standard 
error as suggested by  Hoechle (2007). Hoechle states that the robust standard error 
accounts for both the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation issue. The results 
obtained from Logit regression are presented in Table 2 bellow. 
  
To measure the impact of corporate governance on audit quality we have used the 
model as shown in equation 1: 
  
ititit
itititititit
PROFLEV
SIZEBSACMFENEDACNEDACAUDITQ


+++
+++++=
76
543210
          (1) 
 
where, i refers to each company for each year t; AUDITQ is a dummy variable 
which takes value 1 if it is engaged with Big Four auditing Firms and 0 otherwise; 
NEDAC is the ratio of non executive director member of the audit committee to a 
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total member of audit committee; FENEDAC is a dummy variable which takes 
value 1 if non-executive director of audit committee is accounting qualified and 0 
otherwise; ACM the frequency of audit committee meetings; BS is the business 
sector of the company; SIZE is the size of the company; LEV is the leverage of the 
company; PROF is the profession of the committee member; 
 
Table 2: Logit Regression 
Dependent Variable 
AUDITQ 
Coefficient Robust 
Std. Error 
Z VIF 
 
-0.786 0.245 -2.75* 1.09 
 
 0.324 0.146  0.87** 1.07 
 
 0.222 0.447   0.31 1.12 
 
-1.875  0.648 -2.71** 1.26 
 
 1.123  0.321  4.28*** 1.39 
 
 0.234  0.342  2.12 1.21 
 
-0.029  0.008   2.45* 1.09 
 
-0.769 -0.786  -0.534 
Number of Obs   605 Prob>Chi2   0.000 
Pseudo R2  0.4321  Mean Vf   1.30 
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01% level 
respectively.  
 
Table 3 presents the results on the bivariate statistical correlation among all the 
relevant variables. The correlation analysis shows that audit quality is positively 
correlated with audit committee independence and financial expertise whereas 
negatively correlated with audit committee meetings. 
 
Table 3: Correlation Analysis  
 AUDITQ NEDAC FENEDAC ACM SIZE PROF LEV 
AUDITQ 1       
NEDAC 0.4079* 1      
FENEDAC 0.3764** 0.4354* 1     
ACM -0.2327 -0.2127 0..2906 1    
SIZE -0.1037** 0.2056** -0.2148* -
0.4328* 
1   
PROF -0.2433** 0.4313* -0.1711* -
0.2492* 
0.1982 1  
LEV 0.4391*** 0.2452** -0.5741* -
0.2101* 
0.2101 -
0.1205 
1 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion  
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Assuming that the first research hypothesis of this study is the positive relationship 
between non-executive directors of the audit committee (NEDAC) with audit quality 
(AUDITQ) the results shown that this hypothesis is rejected as presented in Table 2.  
 
On the opposite the coefficient for NEDAC is negative, -0.786,  and statistically 
significant at 10% level of significance (Z statistic -2.75).   However, this relation 
remains significantly negative when the non-executive directors are measured as the 
number of non-executive directors on the committee as a proportion. Audit 
committee independence has a negative relation to audit quality. The findings of the 
study are consistent with the other findings by Chan et al., (2013). They found that 
audit committee independence has a negative relation with audit quality on the 
interaction of audit committee independence and audit industry specialization. It is 
also supporting the view that the audit committee independence director is 
significant in guaranteeing the respectability of the financial reporting process.
 
 
 
Another hypothesis to be tested is the positive relationship between the financial 
expertise of non-executive director’s audit committee (FENEDAC) and audit quality 
(AUDITQ). The study shows that the relationship is positive, coefficient 0,324 
statistically significant at 5% level. The financial expertise of non-executive director 
is measured as the actual number of audit committee members who have the 
financial expertise or as a dichotomy. The result is not consistent with the study of 
Lin, Li and Yang (2006) that do not provide any significant relationship between 
accounting or financial expertise and audit quality.  
 
5. Conclusion  
 
The issue of corporate scandals has a negative effect in accounting manipulations, 
regulators, practitioners, researchers and organizations anywhere in the world. 
Therefore, there is a need to review the code of corporate that governed the 
corporations of many countries. As such the new regulations and practices in 
developed countries, Indonesia was not lacked behind.
 
This study addresses the 
problem that arises on the poor and fraudulent financial reporting in Indonesia that 
revealed the role and the responsibilities of board audit committee has to play in the 
organization and to provide openness information or results either directly or 
indirectly as they are charged with overseeing financial reporting. Audit committees 
assume imperative parts in financial parts of corporate governance as they guarantee 
audit quality while in the meantime securing the enthusiasm of investors. The audit 
committee and accounting firms play a significant role in ascertaining the validity, 
acceptability, and reliability of high quality audits.  
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